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Quantum digital signatures apply quantum mechanics to 
the problem of guaranteeing message integrity and non-
repudiation with information-theoretical security, which 
are complementary to the confidentiality realized by 
quantum key distribution. Previous experimental 
demonstrations have been limited to transmission 
distances of less than 5 km of optical fiber in a laboratory 
setting. Here we report the first demonstration of 
quantum digital signatures over installed optical fiber as 
well as the longest transmission link reported to date. 
This demonstration used a 90-km long differential phase 
shift quantum key distribution system to achieve 
approximately one signed bit per second – an increase in 
the signature generation rate of several orders of 
magnitude over previous optical fiber demonstrations.  
OCIS codes: (060.0060) Fiber optics and optical communications; 
(060.5565) Quantum communications; (060.5060) Phase modulation; 
(030.5260) Photon counting.  
 
For many years, it was generally trusted that a simple handwritten 
signature was hard to forge and, therefore, could be taken as 
certification that the signatory was willing to be considered a 
source of the message and agreed with the contents. In addition, 
there was an acceptance that a signed message would be validated 
by a third party, which allowed complex transaction systems to 
operate with reasonable ease.  
     The field of digital signatures seeks to restore some of the 
practical security aspects of handwritten signatures lost in the 
transition to digital communications. Digital signatures must 
guarantee no forging (that a message is signed by the legitimate 
sender and has not been modified), and non-repudiation (Alice 
cannot repudiate her message, that is, successfully deny that she 
sent it). Currently used digital signature schemes typically rely on 
“one-way” functions, which are computationally easy to evaluate in 
one direction but computationally difficult to invert without 
additional information. However, there is no existing proof of the 
long-term security of these signature schemes and they are 
vulnerable to algorithmic breakthroughs, emerging quantum data 
processing technologies and even significant large-scale 
investment in conventional computational technologies, – thus 
they only offer “computational security” against an attacker with 
currently accepted standards of reasonable computational 
resources. 
Naturally, there is strong motivation to develop digital signature 
schemes that offer “information-theoretical security”, meaning that 
they are secure against all attackers, even those with unlimited 
computational resources Wegman-Carter message authentication 
offers information-theoretical security. However, to guarantee 
non-repudiation as well, one possibility is to use quantum digital 
signatures. QDS schemes operate using technology similar to that 
of QKD but employ protocols that do not require distillation of a 
fully secret key. Indeed, it is possible that both QKD and QDS 
schemes can work in parallel along the same optical fibers. This 
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